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Who Got Their Way? Advocacy Coalitions and the Irish Climate Change Law 
 
Abstract: Which organisations saw their positions on two contentious issues reflected in the 
Irish climate law of 2015, and what role did advocacy coalitions play in the policy process? 
These questions are answered drawing theoretically from the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
and by conducting a network analysis of survey data collected from the organisations involved 
in the national climate policy process. The study finds that several institutionally important or 
economically powerful organisations, particularly those involved in the agricultural sector, as 
well as the government parties saw their preferences reflected in the law. This resulted in 
legislation that excluded binding emission reductions targets, differentiating it from similar 
laws introduced in other European countries. Organisations in favour of stronger regulation 
formed a coalition to advocate for their positions, but they largely failed to get their way.  
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Introduction 
In recent years, several countries have introduced national climate legislation to establish the 
legal framework for driving a transition to a low carbon future. An analysis of the political 
contest over such laws can help us understand the dynamics of domestic climate politics and 
the reasons behind countries’ policy choices. Such understanding is important because, even 
though climate change obligations are agreed in international negotiations, it is within countries 
where policy pathways are decided. 
Researchers have previously explained national environmental policy choices by 
analysing the preferences of political actors (Hochstetler and Viola, 2012), the emphasis that 
political parties put on environmental protection (Schulze, 2014), the influence of veto players 
(Madden, 2014), the role of policy entrepreneurs (Carter and Childs, 2017), experimentation 
with governance innovations (Matschoss and Repo, 2018), the degree of centralization in 
national executives (Leinaweaver and Thomson, 2016), the level of political consensus 
required (Poloni-Staudinger, 2008), and how policy actors can use the resources available to 
them (Compston, 2009). Here, we draw on ideas from the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(ACF) and the field of policy network analysis to investigate how the structure and internal 
dynamics of the Irish climate change policy network shaped Ireland’s national climate law - 
The Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act 2015 (CALCD Act).  
We identify two issues that were particularly contentious: the exclusion of greenhouse 
gas emissions reduction targets, and the composition and independence of the Climate Change 
Advisory Council (CCA Council). Our objectives are to establish which organisations saw their 
positions on these issues reflected in the law, and to determine the role advocacy coalitions 
played in the policy process. The case is particularly interesting because, unlike similar 
legalisation in other EU countries (UK, Austria, Denmark, Finland and Sweden), the Irish law 
does not include specific emissions reduction targets. Their omission is significant because 
Ireland is currently one of the worst performers in the EU (Green Budget Europe, 2016). 
Indeed, the Irish Environmental Protection Agency projects that the country will not meet its 
EU 2020 targets (EPA, 2017).   
The Fine Gael-Labour coalition government formed in 2011 agreed in principle to 
introduce climate legislation, but made no promises about its form or content. An 
environmental coalition pushed for a law that would include emissions reduction targets, but 
the government rejected the idea. Several organisations that were either institutionally 
important or economically powerful also opposed targets, with two of the most influential 
organisations involved in Ireland’s agricultural sector among those sharing the government’s 
position. In addition to binding targets, the environmental coalition lobbied for the 
establishment of an independent CCA Council. The government initially rejected their 
proposals, but in the final stage of the law’s development granted the Council legal 
independence. However, the composition of the Council differs from what the environmental 
coalition had proposed. The law reserves four of the ten places on the Council for the directors 
or chief executives of The Environmental Protection Agency, the Economic and Social 
Research Institute, the Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland and Teagasc (the Agriculture 
and Food Development Authority). Environmental coalition actors were not convinced that all 
these organisations were fully independent of both state and stakeholder interests.  
The results of this study do not meet the ACF expectation that coalitions play a central 
role in a policy process. In the Irish climate change policy domain, only one coalition advocated 
policy positions and it was unable to persuade those with decision-making power to adopt its 
proposals. Those who did get their way were powerful organisations that did not engage in 
coalition building. Rather, their positions were reflected in the law because they aligned with 
the government’s preferences. Consequently, we suggest the importance of comparative 
research that examines the conditions under which advocacy coalitions matter for policy 
outcomes and the conditions under which they do not. 
 
The Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act  
The debate over a national climate law began just prior to the 2007 general election 
when Friends of the Earth Ireland proposed that national climate legislation similar to the UK’s 
Climate Change Act be introduced. Their proposal failed to gain enough support to proceed 
through the legislative process when the Labour Party introduced it in the Seanad (The upper 
house of the Irish national legislature) later that year. Following the election, the Green Party 
entered government for the first time, albeit as a minority partner with Fianna Fáil and the 
Progressive Democrats. They had no plans in their manifesto to introduce climate legislation, 
but did pledge to reduce emissions by 3 per cent per year. The Green Party significantly 
strengthened their relative position in the coalition after the vote share won by the government 
parties at the local elections in 2009 fell dramatically and several independent Teachtaí Dála 
(TDs - Members of Parliament) withdrew their support for the government. This change 
enabled the Greens to compel Fianna Fáil to commit to the introduction of climate legislation. 
In December 2009, the Green Party’s John Gormley, who at the time was Minister for the 
Environment, Heritage and Local Government, published a Framework for Climate Change 
Bill 2010 (Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government, 2010a) and stated his 
intention to publish a climate bill in 2010. He pursued this objective despite opposition from 
the Departments of Agriculture and Finance, and the Taoiseach (Prime Minister), as well as 
some civil servants within the Department of the Environment (Torney, 2017). 
In late 2010, the Joint Committee on Climate Change and Energy Security published a 
report on climate change law (Joint Committee on Climate Change and Energy Security, 2010). 
The report shaped the content of the Climate Change Response Bill the government produced 
soon after (Oireachtas, 2010). The bill envisioned an emissions reduction trajectory of 2.5% 
per year and a cumulative reduction of 80% by 2050, mirroring the target of the UK’s Climate 
Change Act. The proposal included these targets despite intensive lobbying from the Irish 
Farmers’ Association (IFA) and other business interests (Minihan, 2015; Torney, 2017). The 
bill also included a provision to establish an advisory board similar to the Committee on 
Climate Change established by the UK’s Climate Change Act. The advisory board would have 
the power to initiate a review of the government’s climate policy, including a review of the 
adequacy of the country’s emissions reduction targets.  
The Green Party tried and failed to introduce the bill amid the political chaos of the 
worst economic crisis in the country’s history - just weeks after the state received a €67.5 
billion bailout from the Troika and the government implemented the most draconian budget in 
the state’s history. The Green Party’s fixation on the bill made it appear out of touch with the 
immediate concerns of the public and went against the preferences of its coalition partners as 
well as several government departments. The Party subsequently lost all its seats in the 
February 2011 general election.    
The government that formed after the election, made up of the centre-right Fine Gael 
Party and the centre-left Labour Party, agreed in their Programme for Government to introduce 
a national climate law (Department of the Taoiseach, 2011). In 2012, a public consultation 
received over 600 submissions, with over 90% of respondents supporting the inclusion of 
emission targets and the establishment of an independent expert advisory body (Oireachtas, 
2013). In early 2013, the Department of the Environment published the draft heads of a Climate 
Action and Low Carbon Development Bill (Department of the Environment, Community and 
Local Government, 2013). The draft did not include emissions reduction targets or provide for 
an independent advisory body. This was referred to the Joint Oireachtas Committee on the 
Environment, Culture and the Gaeltacht, which held public hearings and sought submissions 
from stakeholders, which led the committee to recommend: that the law define ‘low carbon’; 
that it establish an expert advisory body independent of both state and stakeholder interests 
(Oireachtas, 2013); and that the roles of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the 
Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), the Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland 
(SEAI), and Teagasc be limited to the provision of technical support.  
The Department of the Environment published a revised bill in 2014 (Department of 
the Environment, Community and Local Government, 2014). The bill did not explicitly state 
that the Council would be independent and reserved places on the Council for the directors or 
chief executives of the EPA, the ESRI, the SEAI and Teagasc. The bill did not define low 
carbon or include emissions reductions targets, despite civil society organisations (Stop 
Climate Chaos, 2014) and some businesses arguing for their inclusion (Irish Corporate Leaders 
on Climate Change, 2014). The IFA (2015) and Ibec, Ireland’s largest employer organisation 
(Ibec, 2013), welcomed their exclusion. 
The Department of the Environment published an updated draft of the bill in January 
2015. Agricultural interests and business groups were broadly satisfied with the bill (Torney, 
2017). NGOs and their allies were disappointed and continued to lobby for the inclusion of 
targets and an independent advisory council. In the summer of 2015, the new Minister for the 
Environment, Alan Kelly of the Labour Party, responded by granting legal independence to the 
CCA Council. He also inserted a reference to climate justice in response to NGOs’ lobbying, 
but rejected their calls to include targets. With these modifications, and the possibility that no 
legislation would be passed before the government’s term ended in early 2016, NGOs scaled 
back their efforts (Torney, 2017). With the 2015 Paris climate conference on the horizon, the 
passing of climate change legislation offered the Labour Party an opportunity for a legislative 
victory during a time when they faced widespread protests in opposition to the government’s 
plans to introduce household water charges. The parliament debated the final draft of the Bill 
in late 2015, and the President signed it into law later that year. 
The passing of an overarching national climate law in Ireland was a lengthy process 
that involved the 2013 bill going through several modifications before its enactment. The result 
was a law that differed in some significant respects from the UK’s Climate Change Act. The 
CALD Act establishes a CCA Council that is formally independent from government, but will 
have members from specific state-funded organisations. The most significant difference 
however is the Irish law’s omission of targets. The Irish law also requires that plans and 
frameworks must be ‘at the least cost to the national economy and adopt measures that are cost-
effective and do not impose an unreasonable burden on the Exchequer’. The omission of targets 
reflects the preferences of the two government parties, which were concerned about how targets 
might affect their plans to expand agricultural output. They judged that the economic costs of 
reducing Ireland’s relatively high level of agricultural emissions (46.8% of the non-EU 
Emissions Trading System total in 2015 (EPA, 2016) outweighed the benefits.   
 
Advocacy Coalition Framework 
The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) is a belief-orientated approach to analysing the 
policymaking process that posits that the best way to understand how policy develops is to 
focus on policy subsystems and the beliefs of the organisations involved in a policy process 
(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993). A subsystem is comprised of a set of public and private 
organisations actively engaged in the debate over a specific policy problem or issue in a 
geographically defined location. The ACF identifies beliefs as the overarching and most 
significant factor underpinning the coordinated behaviour of actors participating in a policy 
process. The ACF assumes policy actors tend to form coalitions with those with whom they 
share beliefs rather than those with whom they share institutional affiliation. These coalitions 
consist of actors ‘from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest group 
leaders, researchers) who share a particular belief system - i.e. a set of basic values, causal 
assumptions, and problem perceptions - and who show a non-trivial degree of coordinated 
activity over time’ (Sabatier 1988: 139). These advocacy coalitions then engage and compete 
in a policy processes with a view to seeing their policy goals achieved.  
Of relevance to the present study are: the ACF’s argument that there is an association 
between the outcome of a policy debate and the policy beliefs of the coalitions that participated 
in the process; and how the framework defines an advocacy coalition - the presence of 
coordinated activity and shared beliefs amongst a subset of organisations. Guided by these 
contentions, we investigate the extent to which the organisations involved in the Irish climate 
change policy process formed advocacy coalitions. We then examine the beliefs of both 
individual organisations and the coalitions, with the objective of determining who supported 
or opposed emission reduction targets and the CCA Council proposed in the 2013 climate bill. 
This approach enables us to establish which organisations saw their preferences reflected in 
the law and to explain the role advocacy coalitions played in the policy process. 
 
Data and Methods 
We use policy network analysis to identify advocacy coalitions (Henry, 2011; Ingold, 2011; 
Matti and Sandstrom, 2011; Gronow and Yla-Anttila, 2016). Policy networks are meso-level 
social structures consisting of a configuration of social relations between interdependent actors, 
which form around a particular policy problem or set of policy issues. Conceived in this way, 
researchers then observe, measure and analyse actors’ beliefs and relationships using network 
analysis methods. Researchers calculate network statistics to gain insights into the roles 
different actors play, measure how power is distributed, examine how subsets of actors engage 
with one another, and to determine how actors are organised or integrated into the network. 
This approach has been taken to analyse international  (Hirschi, 2010), national (Ingold & 
Fischer 2014; Ingold 2011; Yun et al. 2014; Gronow and Ylä-Anttila, 2016) and sub-national 
(Elgin & Weible 2013; Frank et al. 2012) climate politics.  
We collected data through a survey of organisations involved in the Irish climate 
change policymaking process. We identified the organisations surveyed using a two-stage 
process. We first analysed multiple documentary sources to identify a list of potential 
organisations to survey (Oireachtas, 2010; Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local 
Government, 2010b; Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government, 
2012; Wagner and Payne, 2017). We then consulted four individuals with expertise in different 
aspects of the national climate policy debate. Each expert identified organisations on the 
preliminary list that they believed we should survey. We then compared the experts’ lists to 
determine which organisations at least three of the experts identified. This left us with 57 
organisations, of which 52 responded to our questionnaire in Autumn 2013. When we 
contacted organisations, we sought the person responsible for articulating the organisation’s 
climate policy positions (or environmental policy when no person had this responsibility). In 
organisations without someone specialising in climate or environmental policy, we contacted 
those as high up the hierarchy as possible. We instructed respondents to indicate their 
organisation’s positions, not their personal opinions. Approximately 30% of respondents 
completed the questionnaire in the presence of one of the researchers. The remaining 
respondents completed the questionnaire online or returned it by post.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
We collected data on the cooperative behaviour of the organisations in the network by asking 
respondents: With which of the listed organisations does your organisation cooperate 
regularly? We used this data to construct an adjacency matrix that corresponds to the network 
of directed cooperation ties between all the organisations surveyed. Following the approach of 
Ansell et al. (2009) and Gronow and Ylä-Anttila (2016), we used Ucinet’s Factions routine to 
identify the membership of densely connected clusters within the network. Using this routine, 
the researcher decides in advance the number of clusters into which the actors are separated. 
In practice, this requires an iterative process whereby several solutions (typically 2, 3, 4 or even 
more) are tested. A researcher determines the number of clusters present in a network based on 
their theoretical motivations and the Faction routine’s measure for the proportion of 
correctness, a statistical measure for the goodness of fit. 
Our questionnaire presented each respondent with a list of organisations that 
participated in domestic climate politics in recent years and asked respondents to indicate 
which of these they believed were especially influential in domestic climate change politics. 
We used these data to calculate a reputational influence score, measured on a scale of 0-1, for 
each organisation; an organisation scores 1 if it is cited as being influential by every other 
organisation in the network, and 0 if no organisations cited it as being influential.  
We collected data on the policy beliefs of each organisation by asking respondents to 
indicate on a five-point Likert scale (No, totally reject = 1, Neutral = 3, Strongly agree = 5) 
their level of support for 21 different climate policies. To calculate the degree to which each 
actor held pro-mitigation beliefs we summed their responses and normalized their level of 
agreement on a scale of 0-1. A score of 1 indicates that an actor strongly agreed with all 21 
policy proposals, while a score of 0 indicates that they totally rejected all 21 proposals. This 
metric allows us to determine which organisations share a similar level of support for pro-
mitigation policies and to measure the distance between the beliefs of organisations.  
We collected from each organisation data about the 2013 draft heads of the climate bill 
by asking if it supported the exclusion of long-term emissions targets and if it agreed with the 
CCA Council proposed by the bill. We asked each respondent to indicate on a scale of -100 to 
+100 their level of agreement or disagreement with the two proposals. A cluster’s average 
score for a proposal is 100 if all organisations in the cluster indicated that they fully supported 
it, while a score of -100 indicates that they all totally disagreed with it. This metric measures 
the level of support expressed by each organisation and by each cluster for each proposal. It 
enables us to identify the clusters with the strongest positions on the two issues and to 
determine the level of consensus on the issues within each of the clusters.  
 
Analysis and Results 
Cooperation clusters 
We began by calculating the clustering coefficient to measure the extent to which actors in the 
network cluster together. At 0.47, the coefficient is almost three times the network density of 
0.17, providing evidence for the presence of clusters. We then applied Ucinet’s Factions 
algorithm to the network of cooperation ties among all 57 organisations as this allows us to 
include the five non-respondents for whom we only have data on their incoming ties. We 
identify three densely connected clusters of organisations and a heterogeneous set of 
unconnected outsiders.1 The proportion of correctness for the four-faction solution is 0.787. 
We reran the routine multiple times to ensure that the placement of actors in each cluster was 
not random. Cluster density describes the proportion of potential connections in a cluster that 
are actual connections. The within group densities of the three clusters are 0.44 (Governance), 
0.48 (Business, Energy, and Research cluster), and 0.47 (Environmental cluster). The density 
of the whole network is 0.16, substantially lower than the density of the ties within each of the 
three clusters. The heterogeneous set of outsider organisations had a within group density of 0, 
indicating that these organisations did not cooperate with one another.  
When we test for the presence of five, six or seven clusters the proportion of correctness 
increases marginally, but the density of the ties in the additional clusters is less than that of the 
whole network. Therefore, increasing the number of clusters only serves to create additional 
sets of heterogeneous unconnected outsiders rather than to identify additional densely 
connected clusters. Moreover, these additional clusters contain the actors with the fewest 
cooperation ties with the actors in the three densely connected clusters when the four-faction 
solution is applied. When we test for the presence of three clusters the proportion of correctness 
falls because it forces the algorithm to integrate the weakly connected actors into three clusters. 
The four factions’ solution is justifiable because it creates three clusters with a similar density 
and places the actors with few cooperation ties with the actors in three densely connected 
clusters into a separate outsider group.  
Table 2, below, lists the ten organisations with the highest reputational influence scores 
in each of the four clusters. Government departments dominate the first cluster, which contains 
 
1 As a robustness check, we applied a hierarchical clustering algorithm to the data (Ward’s method using 
Manhattan distances). This also generates three clusters. Each contains slightly fewer organisations, but the 
overwhelming majority of the most influential members in each of the clusters were the same. SEAI is the only 
influential actor to be assigned to a different cluster, moving from the Business, Energy and Research cluster to 
the governance cluster. 
many of the organisations perceived to be the most influential in the network. The second 
cluster is more heterogeneous, primarily containing organisations with energy interests but also 
several research institutions and non-energy related private sector actors. NGOs dominate the 
third cluster, but it also contains three broadly left of centre political parties. There are no actors 
in the third cluster among the ten most influential in the network and the average influence 
score of the organisations in this cluster is considerably lower than that for the first two clusters. 
In the heterogeneous set of unconnected outsiders, the only actor with a high reputational 
influential score relative to other organisations in the network is the Irish Farmer’s Association 
(IFA), which, interestingly, is perceived to be more influential than all the political parties as 
well as all other non-government actors in the network.   
Fine Gael, the senior party in government, is also in the set of unconnected actors, but 
its influence score is relatively low, a surprising result given that one of their most well-known 
TDs was Minister for the Environment when we conducted the survey. We suspect this finding 
may have been influenced by the questionnaire wording, which asked respondents to indicate 
which organisations they believed were influential in climate politics in recent years; Fine Gael 
had only been in government for 18 months when we started collecting data (following 14 
years in opposition). Its low score may also partly be because scoring high on the reputational 
influence measure is not only correlated with influence over decision-making but also with the 
extent to which an actor is embedded in a network (Ingold & Leifeld 2016), which Fine Gael 
is not. That an actor with a low reputational influence score has few network ties is in line with 
previous research that found a tendency for policy actors to attribute more power to those with 
whom they collaborate and for actors to collaborate with those they perceive to be influential 
(Fischer & Sciarini 2015). Fine Gael’s lack of cooperation ties may reflect the fact that, as the 
main party in government, it did not need to engage in coalition building to get its way. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Policy beliefs within clusters 
We use the composite scale variable that measures the strength of pro-mitigation beliefs for 
each organisation (see methods section) to calculate means and standard deviations of the 
beliefs of organisations in each cluster. This allows us to measure the extent to which 
organisations within each of the three clusters shared similar policy beliefs. We only analyse 
the beliefs data for the 52 survey respondents. Three non-respondents are in the heterogeneous 
set of unconnected outsiders, one in the Governance cluster and one in the Business, Energy 
and Research cluster.  
The actors in the Governance cluster and in the Business, Energy, and Research cluster 
expressed almost identical beliefs, in both their strength and their distribution (see means and 
standard deviations, Table 3). Their beliefs almost fully encapsulate the whole range of 
positions expressed by all those who answered the questionnaire (Figure 1), providing evidence 
for the lack of consensus on policy positions within either of these two clusters.  
 
[Table 3 here] 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
The organisations in the Business, Energy, and Research cluster have quite different individual 
objectives, especially with regards to distributional and regulatory burden sharing. For 
example, ESB is in conflict with commercial rival Airtricity because the former is heavily 
invested in the generation of electricity using coal, while the latter has invested much more in 
wind and gas. In the Governance cluster, the two organisations that indicated least support for 
pro-mitigation beliefs were Teagasc and the Department of Agriculture, both of which are 
advocates for the agricultural sector. In the same cluster, two scientific organisations, The Earth 
Institute and the Environmental Protection Agency, expressed substantially greater support for 
pro-mitigation policies, putting them in conflict with Teagasc and the Department of 
Agriculture. We therefore find no evidence to support the proposition that either the 
Governance cluster or the Business, Energy, and Research cluster is organised as an advocacy 
coalition.  
The pro-mitigation beliefs of organisations in the cluster dominated by NGOs were 
stronger on average than those of actors in the other clusters (Figure 1). The distribution of 
their beliefs was also half as narrow (Table 3). Their views are therefore distinct from those of 
the other clusters, and there was more consensus within the cluster about the range of policies 
they supported. These results provide strong evidence that these organisations form a pro-
mitigation environmental advocacy coalition.  
The heterogeneous set of actors did not engage in any cooperative behaviour with one 
another and expressed a wide variety of beliefs (Table 3), and so do not form an advocacy 
coalition. Fine Gael, the senior party in government, was in this set, but the strength of its 
beliefs is unknown as it left many of the survey questions unanswered. The Irish Farmer’s 
Association (IFA), the most influential actor in the set, indicated least support for pro-
mitigation policies. Thus the three organisations in the network – the IFA, the Department of 
Agriculture, and Teagasc – that indicated least support for pro-mitigation policies were heavily 
involved in agricultural issues, and were also among the ten most influential in the network, as 
perceived by survey respondents. In response to these findings, we investigated the extent to 
which the actors most involved in Ireland’s agricultural sector cooperated with one another on 
climate policy issues. We find no cooperation ties between the IFA and the Department of 
Agriculture, Teagasc or Bord Bia (The Irish Food Board). The three latter organisations did 
report cooperating with one another, but they do not form an agricultural coalition separate 
from the Governance cluster as each has multiple cooperation ties with the actors in that cluster. 
 
Policy beliefs about the Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Bill 2013 
We asked each organisation to indicate on a scale of -100 to +100 if they agreed or disagreed 
with the CCA Council proposed by the bill and if they agreed or disagreed with the inclusion 
of targets in the bill (see supplementary materials for respondent’s positions on these two 
issues). We used these data to develop two composite measures (see methods section) for the 
strength of each cluster’s support for the two proposals (Table 4). We do not calculate a 
composite measure for the set of heterogeneous actors because six organisations did not answer 
the climate bill questions.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
The responses from the organisations in the Governance cluster indicate that as a group 
they slightly disagreed with the inclusion of targets and slightly agreed with the proposed CCA 
Council. Most actors in the cluster indicated a neutral position on both issues, but some 
organisations took relatively strong positions. For example, Fianna Fáil (the main opposition 
political party) supported the inclusion of targets, while the Department of the Environment 
and the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) both strongly opposed their inclusion. 
It is not surprising that the Department of the Environment supported the 2013 bill as they 
drafted it. Nor is it surprising that NESC opposed targets, as they had excluded any mention of 
a need for them in a report they published in 2013 analysing Ireland’s climate change 
challenges (NESC Secretariat, 2013). 
Among the organisations with agricultural interests, the Department of Agriculture 
(DoA) opposed the inclusion of long-term targets because adhering to them would make it 
extremely difficult for Ireland to meet the objectives of Food Harvest 2020 and Food Wise 
2025 (the government’s strategies to increase the country’s agricultural output). The DoA’s 
own research projects that the best-case scenario if these strategies were to be successful would 
be that the absolute amount of emissions from the agricultural sector would remain about 
constant - cutting emissions and significantly increasing agricultural output does not seem 
possible (Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine, 2013). The DoA also supported the 
inclusion of Teagasc in the CCA Council. The IFA shared the positions of the DoA, opposing 
emissions targets (Torney, 2017) and welcoming the inclusion of Teagasc on the CCA Council 
(Irish Farmers’ Association, 2015). However, these two organisations did not report 
collaboratively advocating for their shared positions. Teagasc indicated a neutral position on 
both targets and the CCA Council, while Bord Bia was neutral on targets but opposed the 
proposed CCA Council. The differences in the beliefs of the four agricultural organisations on 
these two issues provide additional evidence that they did not form a separate advocacy 
coalition. Of the four, the DoA and the IFA were the ones that most clearly got their way with 
the bill, but this did not happen through building an advocacy coalition or by collaborating with 
like-minded organisations. 
Organisations in the Business, Energy, and Research cluster did not indicate uniform 
positions on the two statements. The Institute of International and European Affairs supported 
the inclusion of targets and disagreed with the proposed CCA Council. SEAI strongly agreed 
with both the proposed CCA Council and the inclusion of targets. Ibec’s positions on the two 
issues were in line with those of the Department of the Environment. Ibec’s opinion is 
important and carries weight because it is Ireland’s largest business and employer association, 
representing the interests of over 7500 private sector organisations, conducting research and 
lobbying government, policymakers and other stakeholders to shape business conditions and 
drive economic growth. Ibec also has two committees (the Energy Policy Committee and the 
Environment Policy Committee) that routinely work with government departments on 
sustainability-related matters.  
Actors in the environmental coalition were almost unanimous in the belief that long-
term emissions reduction targets needed to be included in an Irish climate law. The coalition 
strongly disagreed with the proposed CCA Council (Table 4), the more vocal actors arguing 
that it should be independent of state and stakeholder interests (Stop Climate Chaos, 2014). 
The Labour Party, the minor party in government when the data were collected for this 
research, was the only organisation in the coalition that agreed with the proposed CCA Council 
and opposed the inclusion of national targets. Its position on targets in 2013 was a significant 
departure from its position in 2009, when it published a climate change bill that stated: “the 
duty of the Taoiseach [is] to ensure that Ireland’s net carbon account for the year 2050 is at 
least 80 per cent lower than the 1990 baseline” (Labour Party, 2009).  
Fine Gael never prioritised climate change legislation (Little, 2017). Phil Hogan, the 
Party’s Minister for the Environment, published a bill in 2013 that did not include targets and 
envisioned the creation of a climate advisory body that would not be permitted to publish its 
reports without the government’s consent. Under his direction, the Department of the 
Environment published revised heads of a bill in 2014. This also omitted targets and excluded 
any reference to the independence of the Council, illustrating how little Fine Gael’s positions 
changed in the intervening period. The bill did however propose to increase the Council’s 
membership from eight to eleven (including the chairperson), thereby reducing the share of ex 
officio members. The party steadfastly maintained its opposition to targets throughout the 
process (Little, 2017; RTÉ, 2014). 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The process that led to the introduction of the Climate Action and Low Carbon Development 
Act saw a particularly contentious debate take place over two issues: emissions reduction 
targets and the composition and independence of the Climate Change Advisory Council. To 
understand the factors that shaped how these issues were addressed in the law, we set out to 
answer two questions: which organisations saw their preferences on these issues reflected in 
the law, and what role did advocacy coalitions play in the policy process? Our findings offer 
empirical results to support Flynn’s (2003) description of the Irish environmental policy 
domain: domestic NGOs are weak, powerful economic actors and government departments 
dominate the policy process, decisions are largely determined by the Cabinet, and economic 
issues are prioritised over ecological concerns.  
Our analysis shows that actors with strong pro-climate action beliefs formed an 
advocacy coalition and successfully put and kept on the political agenda the idea of an Irish 
climate law. Nevertheless, they failed to see their support for emissions reduction targets 
translated into legislation. Their campaign to persuade the government to establish a climate 
change advisory council similar to the UK’s Committee on Climate Change was not wholly 
successful either. The Irish law does establish a legally independent Council, but with an 
important caveat. Four of the ten members of the Council are directors or chief executives of 
organisations that actors in the environmental coalition believed were not sufficiently 
independent of state and stakeholder interests: the EPA, ESRI, SEAI, and Teagasc. They were 
particularly concerned about the inclusion of Teagasc, which they argued was too close to 
agricultural business interests.  
The most significant organisations to see their preferences reflected in the law were the 
two parties in government, Fine Gael and Labour, and the two most influential organisations 
involved in the agricultural sector, the Department of Agriculture and the Irish Farmer’s 
Association. The government parties’ opposition to targets and their decision to exclude them 
from the law was largely driven by their concern that targets would negatively impact plans to 
expand the country’s agricultural output. The Department of Agriculture and the IFA shared 
the belief that targets would constrain the agricultural sector. Several other institutionally 
important and economically powerful organisations also opposed targets (see supplementary 
materials). Even though these organisations were fewer in number than those supporting 
targets, they were perceived as being markedly more influential.  
The debate over the composition and independence of the CCA Council was less 
contentious. Fine Gael and the Labour Party both initially agreed with the 2013 bill’s proposal, 
but in the very late stages of the law’s development the environmental coalition successfully 
persuaded the newly instated Labour Party Minister for the Environment to grant the Council 
legal independence. The Minister rejected the environmental coalition’s calls to change the 
composition of the Council. Most actors that supported the proposed Council were the same as 
those that that opposed targets (see supplementary materials).   
Interestingly, organisations did not get their way by forming advocacy coalitions. The 
IFA and the Department of Agriculture did not report cooperating with each other on climate 
policy. There is, of course, the possibility that individuals working for the DoA and the IFA 
did engage in informal cooperation and communication, even though as organisations they did 
not report cooperation in our survey. Such informal cooperation could be investigated via in-
depth interviews. Other actors involved in the agricultural sector, Teagasc and Bord Bia, 
reported cooperating with each other and with the Department of Agriculture, but not with the 
IFA. Teagasc and Bord Bia do not however belong to the group of organisations that got their 
way as both were neutral on targets. Teagasc was also neutral on the proposed council, while 
Bord Bia opposed it. It would be difficult to argue, then, that there would have been an 
agricultural advocacy coalition marked by their shared beliefs and collaboration ties. Rather, 
whatever influence the IFA and the Department of Agriculture had on the bill was based on 
other factors. The most likely is that the IFA, the Department of Agriculture and the Fine Gael 
Minister for Agriculture all supported the expansion of Ireland’s agricultural output for 
economic reasons. The contextual reason for the success of economic arguments against 
emission reduction targets was the dire economic situation Ireland experienced during the years 
when the climate law was developed. Under these conditions, reviving the economy by 
spurring growth in a sector with significant potential became a desirable option, and the 
arguments opposing targets in the name of increasing agricultural output for export fell on 
fertile ground. 
Perhaps the most notable limitation of this study is it reliance on cross-sectional data. 
The most significant consequence of this is that it is not possible to be sure that the clusters and 
the coalition that we identify accurately capture long-lasting cooperation patterns. Our primary 
data also does not allow us to determine if any organisations changed their positions on the two 
issues after the survey was conducted, before the bill was revised or since the law was enacted. 
We addressed this by providing a qualitative account of any significant changes in the 
preferences of the most influential actors involved in the process.  
In addition to analysing the policy process that led to the establishment of the current Irish 
climate change legislation, we also contribute to the Advocacy Coalition Framework literature. 
Much of the literature tends to identify and describe the coalitions in a specific policy domain 
or to examine whether shared beliefs lead to coordinated action. We go beyond these efforts 
by analysing the role of advocacy coalitions during the design stage of a specific law’s 
development, by determining which organisations saw their positions reflected in the final 
piece of legislation and by showing that coalition building was not key to getting one’s way. 
Indeed, this study shows how the formation of a coalition was used as a strategy of the weak, 
demonstrating that the approach is no guarantee of political success. In particular, when those 
who form a coalition are competing against those who do not need to because they already hold 
a significant amount of informal influence and share the interests and preferences of those in 
political power.  
The ACF contends that policy change can occur through four pathways: external 
subsystem events, internal subsystem dynamics, policy‐oriented learning, and cross‐coalition 
policy learning. This study shows how Ireland’s domestic climate policy was influenced by an 
external event, the passing of a climate law in the UK, and how the internal dynamics of the 
Irish climate policy domain resulted in legislation that differed from the UK law in several 
ways. The presence of only one advocacy coalition in the network implies that cross-coalition 
learning could not and did not occur. Instead, the subset of actors that favoured strong climate 
action learned about the idea of national climate legislation from abroad - a finding that runs 
counter to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s (1993, p.17) contention that “policy innovations 
normally occur first at a subnational level and then may get expanded into nationwide 
programs”. Thus, future research on the role of advocacy coalitions in national-level policy 
processes might draw on the policy transfer literature (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000) to 
investigate if advocacy coalitions are more likely to be successful at transferring policies when 
they originate at the subnational level of government than when they come from aboard. 
Further studies might also consider the circumstances under which cross-coalition learning 
occurs between coalitions in different countries or between those at different levels of 
government.  
Finally, in light of the finding that coalitions played a minor role in the case examined 
here, an important question for future research is whether advocacy coalitions have much 
influence at all in highly centralized Westminster-style parliamentary democracies such as 
Ireland, where executive power tends to be concentrated in single-party-majority cabinets. 
Research in the United States, where the ACF was originally developed, has shown that 
advocacy coalitions are influential in large pluralist multi-level democracies with multiple veto 
points. In corporatist European democracies such as Sweden or Switzerland, ruling parties need 
broad support to move forward with a policy idea. Research designs comparing the role of 
coalitions across these three kinds of political systems could determine whether there are 
differences in the roles, strategies and the likelihood of success for advocacy coalitions 
depending on the institutional context. Such comparative research would help establish an 
understanding of the conditions under which coalitions matter for policy outcomes as well as 
the conditions under which other factors are more important.  
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Table 1 Respondents by Organisation Type 
Organisation Type No. of Organisations Response Rate 
Government Departments, State Agencies, Semi-State 
Bodies, and Local Authorities 
17 82%  
Energy  6 100% 
Scientific Research  8 100% 
NGOs & Advocacy Groups 11 100% 
Businesses, Business Interest Groups, Consultancies 9 78%  
Agricultural Interests 1 100% 
Political Parties 5 100% 
 
Table 2 Most Influential Organisations in each cluster and their reputational influence score 
 Governance (Rep. Inf.) Business, Energy, and 
Research (Rep. Inf.) 
Environmental 
Coalition (Rep. Inf.) 
Heterogeneous 
Set of Actors 
(Rep. Inf.) 
1. Dept. of the Environment, 
Community and Local 
Government (0.71) 
Sustainable Energy 
Authority of Ireland 
(0.65) 
An Taisce (National 
Trust for Ireland) 
(0.33) 
Irish Farmers’ 
Association 
(0.43) 
2. Environmental Protection 
Agency (0.63) 
Ibec (0.41) Environmental Pillar 
(0.33) 
Byrne Ó 
Cléirigh (0.20) 
3. Dept. of Communication, 
Energy and Natural 
Resources (0.59) 
ESRI (Economic and 
Social Research Institute) 
(0.37) 
Friends of the Earth 
Ireland (0.27) 
 
Fine Gael (0.18) 
4. Dept. of Agriculture, Food 
and the Marine (0.53) 
Irish Wind Energy 
Association (0.37) 
Trócaire (0.25) 
 
Irish Corporate 
Leadership on 
Climate Change 
(0.18) 
5. Dept. of Finance (0.45) Commission for Energy 
Regulation (0.35) 
Mary Robinson 
Foundation (0.22) 
Green IFSC 
(0.16) 
6. National Economic and 
Social Council (0.45) 
Bord na Móna (0.27) Stop Climate Chaos 
(0.20) 
Irish Academy of 
Engineering 
(0.12) 
7. Teagasc (Agriculture and 
Food Development 
Authority) (0.43) 
IIEA (Institute of 
International and 
European Affairs) (0.27) 
Green Party (0.18) 
 
Chambers 
Ireland (.10) 
8. Dept. of Transport, Tourism 
and Sport (0.33) 
EirGrid (0.25) Birdwatch Ireland 
(0.16) 
National 
Offshore Wind 
Energy 
Association of 
Ireland (0.10) 
9. Dept. of Taoiseach (0.31) Bord Gáis Energy (0.24) 
 
Labour Party (0.14) 
 
Office of Public 
Works (0.08) 
10. Dept. of Jobs, Enterprise and 
Innovation (0.29) 
Coillte (0.22) 
 
Concern (0.14) 
 
Better 
Environment 
Nuclear Energy 
(0.00) 
  ESB (Electricity Supply 
Board) (0.22) 
 
Oxfam (0.14)  
 
 
Table 3 Factions  
 
Cluster 
 
Density 
 
Strength of Pro-Mitigation Beliefs (mean and s.d.) 
Governance  0.44 0.72 (0.115) 
Business, Energy, and Research 0.48 0.73 (0.107) 
Environmental Coalition 0.47 0.81 (0.057) 
Heterogeneous Set of Actors 0 0.67 (0.14) 
 
 
Table 4 Positions on targets and the proposed advisory panel (a positive number signifies support for 
the statement) 
Cluster Inclusion of Targets Proposed CCA Council 
Governance  -12  +14 
Business, Energy, and Research +1  -2  
Environmental Coalition +75 -51 
 
 
Figure 1: Policy Beliefs (black dots = means; black lines = one standard deviation; red line = network 
mean) 
 
 
 
 
